Over the past decade, the Cyberspace has seen an increasing number of attacks coming from botnets using the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture. Peer-to-Peer botnets use a decentralized Command & Control architecture. Moreover, a large number of such botnets already exist, and newer versions-which significantly differ from their parent bot-are also discovered practically every year. In this work, the authors propose and implement a novel hybrid framework for detecting P2P botnets in live network traffic by integrating Neural Networks with Bayesian Regularization. Bayesian Regularization helps in achieving better generalization of the dataset, thereby enabling the detection of botnet activity even of those bots which were never used in training the Neural Network. Hence such a framework is suitable for detection of newer and unseen botnets in live traffic of a network. This was verified by testing the Framework on test data unseen to the Detection module (using untrained botnet dataset), and the authors were successful in detecting this activity with an accuracy of 99.2 %.
enormous, considering the capability of the bots to autonomously and automatically run on the host computers. Table 1 lists the attacks that are possible to deploy using Botnets. behind an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies Scareware Inducing users to buy a rogue anti-virus to regain access of their corrupted system Botnets using IRC as the channel for Command and Control (C & C) are the ones which can be detected most easily. This is because of the characteristics of the communication channel that IRC provides.
Only one central C & C server exists in an IRC based Botnet, and if the server is incapacitated, the entire Botnet is taken down. This single point of failure in IRC botnets led to the emergence of 'smarter' Botnets, such as those which use P2P architecture for Botnet communication. P2P architecture for botnets, shown in figure 1b, is tolerant to the single point of failure as any node in the P2P network can act as both a client and a server. Even if one or two malicious nodes in the P2P Botnet are taken down, the gaps in the network overlay are filled by readjusting the architecture and the network continues to operate under the control of the attacker, shown in figure 1b.
Although P2P bots were on the rise since early 21st century, with the variants of Agobot, Spybot and Sinit launching many exploits on the internet, the task of detecting and mitigating them remains a challenge. Table 2 shows a timeline of P2P Bots, which are continuing to evolve till date introducing complex evolutionary mechanisms to make themselves robust: Recently social networks have also been used as a medium for commanding the bots by the bot-masters.
Users of a social networks will generally trust the links and messages coming from the network. This fact was exploited by the Svelta malware (Wood 2010) where the Botnet used a twitter account named upd3t3, and commands were sent as tweets from this account in base64 encoded form. The infected bots were the followers of this twitter account, which were programmed to convert the base64 encoded tweets into commands to be executed.
There have also been anonymous groups which asked for volunteers to opt-in to becoming a part of a politically-based Botnet activity. One group in 2010, comprising of 30,000 bots, announced its support for Wikileaks by launching DDoS attacks against anti-Wikileaks companies. (BBC News 2012) Botnet activity was also found in mobile devices, smartphones and tablet PCs in the recent times. Zeus was observed on many Nokia phones which use Symbian OS, which defeated the online banking twostep authentication by monitoring the SMS sent by the bank. (Apvrille 2012) Thus P2P Botnet detection and mitigation is proving to be an extremely important area of research both on the desktop and the mobile platforms. Research on how they recruit bot members, form the botnet and finally attack is given in (Wang, et al. 2009) .
In this paper the authors propose a novel hybrid framework by integrating Neural Networks with a Bayesian Regularization pre-processing module. Bayesian Regularization helps in achieving better generalization of the dataset, thereby enabling the detection of botnet activity of even those bots which were never used in training the Neural Network. This means that such a framework is suitable for detection of newer and unseen botnets in live traffic of a network, as evident by the results of this research. Owing to the generalization provided by Bayesian Regularization, the authors were successful in detecting activity of untrained malicious bots with an accuracy of 99.2 %. This model was then integrated into a Java API, which can be used as a pre-processor module for any Intrusion Detection
System for the real-time detection of any botnet traffic on the network. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The previous work done on P2P botnet detection is described in the next section (section 2). Section 3 describes in detail the methodology of the author's experiment and gives a description of the algorithm used to identify the botnet activity, and section 4 describes the experimental setup that was used to conduct the research work. The paper concludes with the results and future scope of this work in section 5. Researchers (Dittrich and Dietrich 2008) explain the challenges and features when dealing with Nugache P2P botnet. Authors in (Stover, et al. 2007 )conclude that it is impossible for a static Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect Nugache traffic. The authors' analysis of Storm concludes that the Storm bot can be detected by configuring an IDS to find the configuration file used by the bot. But it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate P2P communication and Storm bot.
RELATED WORK ON P2P BOTNET DETECTION
Authors (Holz, et al. 2008 )develop ways to mitigate the Storm worm and introduce an active measurement technique to enumerate the number of infected hosts by reverse engineering of the bot's binary executable, in order to identify the function which generates the key that is used for searching other infected machines and bots.
( Stewart February 2007) reports an in depth analysis of Peacomm and how it spams large number of emails to many accounts holding an executable attachment.
Authors in (Grizzard, et al. 2007 ) retrieve the hashes of malware and use it for locating a zombie nodes' activities in a P2P network. They argue that if a peer searches for a hash of a malware, it must be a zombie.
Authors in (Nagaraja, et al. 2010 ) devise techniques to localize Botnet members based on the unique communication patterns arising from the structured overlay topologies used for command and control.
They examine if ISPs can detect the efficient communication structures of P2P bots. Their algorithm isolates this based on the information about which pairs of nodes communicate with one another.
Liu et al. in (Liu, et al. 2010) propose adaptive mechanisms to detect a variety of P2P Botnets. But their solutions can be applied only in the attacking stage of the Botnet. Their study was successful on Trojan
Peacomm, but the implications are not clear when dealing with other categories/types of Botnets.
Authors in (Tarng, et al. 2011) use P2P flow identification techniques to monitor and filter traffic flows, isolating the hosts when they connect to the Botnet. Their work uses Bayes Classifier and Neural Network classifier to detect the IP address of the infected systems.
Researchers in (Gu, et al. 2008 )present a framework named BotMiner, which detects both centralized IRC and P2P botnets using an anomaly based detection system. The assumption in this regard is that bots are coordinated malware that exhibit similar communication patterns and behaviours. BotMiner targets a group of compromised systems belonging to a monitored network, whereas it fails to detect a simple system which might be a part of a Botnet which is not in the monitored network's zone.
Researchers (Noh, et al. 2009 ) detect Botnet activity by detecting similar flows occurring between groups of hosts in the network on a regular basis. Flows with similar behaviors are labeled into groups, and a transition model of the grouped flows is constructed using a probability matrix. The authors compute a 'likelihood ratio' and use that ratio for detection of bots.
A self-organization map algorithm was applied by authors in (Langin, et al. 2009 ) to detect P2P Botnets, in which they assume that there would be numerous failed connection attempts from exterior to interior in firewall.
Most of the previous research work has focused on detecting a specific botnet activity. Such methods
were not reported to be successful in detecting bots whose traffic characteristics were not used in training the machine learning algorithm. Clearly, it is seen that using a machine learning based approach is superior in detecting malicious traffic when compared to a traditional signature based approach as the bot masters redesign the bots from time to time, and the functionality, behavior etc. of the botnet varies quite significantly with each new version of the bot. Moreover previous works have not seen much research on deploying the detection module in a real-time scenario to monitor and mitigate botnet activity on a network.
Methodology

Feature Extraction
Machine learning algorithms require appropriate 'features' as inputs in order to train models. For this research, samples of certain P2P bots were deployed on a test-bed (as described in the next section) and network trace files (pcaps) were obtained. These trace files were then used for feature extraction using an Open-source tool Netmate (Netmate 2011 For these experiments, the authors removed the first four features (Source IP, Source port, Destination IP, Destination port) as they are totally dependent on the network configuration on which the bots are deployed. Information Gain Attribute Evaluation was done using the Ranker Algorithm in order find the most influential features of the entire feature set. This method evaluates the worth of an attribute by measuring the information gain with respect to the class, where Information Gain is described by the following equation:
Information Gain (Class, Attribute) = H(Class) -H(Class | Attribute).
The following were the first 15 in the list, with their Information gain shown in the first column. 
Bayesian Regularized Neural Network
Artificial Neural network is a very useful tool for Machine Learning which has been applied in several scenarios. It has been applied to many cases such as text pronunciation example trained by a back propagation neural network (Franco, et al. 1997) . It has also found many applications in the field of pattern recognition (Carpenter and Grossberg 1988) . In predictive modeling, application of the Artificial Neural Networks has the advantage of being able to capture relationships which are highly complex.
Neural network architecture, A, consists of a specification of the number of layers, the number of units in each layer, the type of activation function performed by each unit, and the available connections between the units. Values for the weight, w, is assigned to the connections in the network, the weighted input, x, sum is mapped with y1(x; w, A), the predicted value of the output. The distance of the predicted value to the training set is measured by some error function. The error for the entire data set is commonly taken to be
Here E is the error function, often called as Mean of Squares of errors (MSE), y1 is the predicted output, x is the input and m is the instance of the data. Here y represents the output data and N represent the total data set.
It has been observed in literature that back propagation neural networks used to train the neural network model give high reliability (Zhang, et al. 2001 ). The back propagation learning algorithm uses a gradient search technique to minimize the mean square error of the output of the network.
The parameters of the back propagation networks are generally set by trial and error. Reserved test data is used to assess its generalization ability (or the cross-validation ability) (MacKay 1992). These parameters change the effective learning model, for example, number of hidden units, weight decay terms etc.
The training of the network is to find a set of weights, w, that gives optimal map between the training set and the predicted set. The learned weights are expected to fit well to new examples. Plain backpropagation learns by performing gradient descent to optimize the error function. More efficient optimization techniques may also be used, such as conjugate gradients or variable metric methods. Figure 2 shows the method of selecting optimal number of hidden neuron using the correlation coefficients at each stage.
However there are certain disadvantages of using back propagation networks: 1. It can over fit the given data.
2. It needs large datasets to correctly map the relationship between the input and outputs.
As explained above, it is seen that although back propagation neural networks are very reliable, they often suffer with the problem of over fitting the experimental data. Over-fitting problem or poor generalization of the given dataset happens when a network over-learns during the training period. The result is a "too well-trained" model, which may not perform well on unseen data. This problem is known as Occam's razor problem (MacKay 1992 ). The principle is that unnecessarily complex models should not be preferred than the simpler ones. In order to address this issue, the method of 'Bayesian inference' is used which automatically addresses the Occam's razor problem.
According to the fundamentals of the Bayesian analysis, the plausibility of alternative hypothesis is represented by probabilities, and inference is performed by evaluating those probabilities. Thus, using Bayesian probability theory it is possible to automatically infer the flexibility of a model warranted by the data. The model can be evaluated by using the simple Bayes rule given by
Where the denominator P (D) is the normalizing constant which makes the final belief add up to 1.
Bayesian Regularization approach minimizes the over-fitting problem by taking into account the 'goodness-of-fit' as well as the network architecture. Hence in this work the Bayesian regularization approach is used for better fitness of the data. The neural network toolbox of MATLAB software package is used for training and testing the given data. Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm with Bayesian regularization function (trainbr) has been used to train the network. The network architecture is obtained for which the network has minimum sum of squares of errors (SSE) and also has better generalization ability. 
Algorithm used and pseudo-code
The entire code is divided into two modules. One module is the getConversations method and the other is testtshark method. getConversations reads from the specified pcap files and invokes Netmate to extract flow statistics from the pcap file which are used to build the BR-ANN model. Testtshark is the real-time module which uses jnetpcap to extract the same features out of live traffic and submits the flows to the Matlab-Weka-API for classification. 
Experimental Setup
Collecting Dataset
The test-bed for this research work consists of a standalone network of Linux systems. The systems were connected to an Access switch in order to form the standalone network. On top of each of these physical machines, the authors ran virtual machines with Windows XP as the operating system. On these virtual machines, samples of Kelihos-Hlux, Zeus, Waledac were deployed. This setup is shown in figure 4 . The samples of these malware were obtained from (contagiodump.blogspot.in and openmalware.com). The network activity of these malware samples were monitored for 48 hours each and the activity was captured by Wireshark. After collecting packet traces of the network activity of each of the malware, right from the infection stage to the attack stage, the pcap files were stored in the database server for further analysis.
The 'malicious dataset' contained a total of 55,824 flows. In order to achieve proper classification, benign traffic consisting of traffic from p2p applications, ftp transfers, telnet sessions, video streaming and mobile updates was collected by the authors, and flows were extracted in the same manner as for malicious traffic. The entire dataset was merged and given to the machine learning algorithm for model generation (described in Section 3.2). 
Real-time Botnet Detection
For real-time detection of botnet activity in the network, a module was deployed on a system which was receiving mirrored traffic from the entire network, as shown in figure 5 . This module utilizes tshark to read the packets and stores them in libpcap format in chunks of 200 MB each. The stored packet captures are converted into conversations (or flows). Each flow is an instance which is to be monitored for malicious activity. Correlation between two variables X and Y is measured using the Pearson product-moment coefficient, which takes the value between -1 and +1 inclusive. It is defined by the formula:
The ideal prediction is supposed to generate a straight line passing through origin at an angle of 45 degrees, as the X-axis and Y-axis represent the experimental and predicted values by each of the methods employed. It is observed that the correlation coefficient is very near to 1. This shows that the goodness of fit of the model generated by Bayesian Regularized ANN is close to exact prediction.
90% of the data is considered as training data and remaining 10% is considered testing data to validate the goodness of fit of the model generated. The correlation obtained by the network trained is very high and is equal to 0.9931. When tested on bots which were not used in the training set, with samples obtained from CAIDA (The CAIDA UCSD Network Telescope "Three Days Of Conficker" -21st
December 2009) and ISOT (Saad, et al. July 19-21, 2011) Network have satisfactory mapping to the experimental data. All the p-value are almost 0.9, indicating the model has good accuracy with the capability of generalization. This shows that the goodness of fit of the model generated by Bayesian Regularized ANN is statistically satisfactory and accurate. The prediction results were also verified with the logs of Cyberoam, a Unified Threat management system deployed at the authors' organization and which is also in use in many corporate organizations.
The packets flagged as malicious by the Bayesian Neural Network Detection Module were also flagged by Cyberoam to be malicious, as shown in figure 11 . This shows that the module build on BR-ANN can be built as an efficient pre-processing engine for existing IDS/IPS solutions.
In this research, existing models of Machine Learning, in the context of P2P botnet detection, were studied. And a better model for Artificial Neural Networks based on Bayesian Regularization was proposed, which is very efficient in the problem context which need good generalization abilities. Thus it is conclusively shown through the statistical tests that the trained BR-ANN model is able to generalize very well and is able to predict the activity of unknown bots' malicious activity.
Detecting specifically the kind of malicious activity and thereby identifying the unknown bot could help the security experts to take appropriate preventive measures. Due to the large bandwidth of the network, shifting to scalable and distributed architecture is a very attractive alternative to consider. Integrating the existing API with Mahout and Hadoop APIs and re-writing the classifier to suit the Map-Reduce paradigm is the future scope of this work. 
